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ABSTRACT 
Modern judicial opinions are by tradition, a reflection of hundreds of years of history and tradition.  Judges 
usually give their decision and order verbally in court, and legally significant and important judgments notably 
from the higher courts, are then published in law reports and become the substance of common law. ‘Dissent’ is 
the written expression of a judicial opinion that results in the court not arriving at a unanimous decision.   Hence, 
the dissenting judge will have to state his disagreement by focusing on the issue(s) of law before proceeding to 
provide an explanation.  Literature  has shown that dissenting opinions are not a feature of all legal jurisdictions 
nor are they presented in the same way. This paper aims to discuss the discourse of ‘dissenting’ from an analysis 
of selected Malaysian judicial opinions. In this respect a mixed-method approach was employed to gather the 
data, while data analysis and the linguistic features were drawn from Trosborg’s (1997) text typology.  The main 
findings reveal that modality, adverbials as well as context-specific   structures alluding to adherence and mutual 
respect, are employed to temper the emotive tone of the judges.  Interestingly however, and contrary to literature, 
non-adherence to such practice has also been located. The question is, is such a position ideological?    
Keywords: adverbs, adverbials; courtroom discourse; dissent; judicial opinion  
INTRODUCTION
Against the backdrop of the many events that have colored the Malaysian judiciary, which 
arose out of the ‘1988 crisis’ (Salleh Buang, 2007), interest and awareness of the functions of 
the third organ of the administrative has increased.  An article that appeared in the Malaysian 
Insider (an Internet news portal that claims to publish ‘unvarnished news from around the 
world’) on the 10th of February 2010 entitled   The Damning Lack of Dissent by Fahri Izzat, 
is testament to this.   True to the rather contentious title, the writer, a lawyer-cum-blogger-
cum-legal activist, lamented the lack of dissenting opinions in current Malaysian appellate 
judgments.  That article adopted a legal-critique flavour arguing for a ‘braver bench’ which it 
claimed, if not present, will inevitably retard the development of the law in Malaysia.
This paper, however, will not take the legal route but  will instead attempt a legal-
linguistic approach   to provide an understanding of how an important feature of courtroom 
discourse, the ‘written word’ of the proceedings, or otherwise known as judicial opinions, is 
realized.  However, this is not a genre analysis of the appellate case report, but rather a focus 
on the dissenting opinion and the linguistic strategies employed by judges as they write their 
departure from the majority decision.  As law is an interpretation of rules by judges,   the paper 
will invariably uncover the covert use of language as judges wield their power and unveil their 
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stance.  This unveiling is significant because Malaysia is a country that practices the rule of law 
and since judicial opinions are a source of law,  in the words of Lebovits, “One way to judge 
judges is to read their opinion”  (2006, p. 1).       
LAW, CASE LAW AND JUDICIAL OPINION
Law can be defined as ‘rules of conduct,’ or a set of rules regulating conduct, the breach of 
which is the application of sanctions.  In Malaysia, the principal sources of law are customary 
law, Islamic law (Syariah), English law (common law and equity) and the statutes or Acts of 
Parliament.   
Case law is a legacy of the English common law where judges mete out justice through 
judicial precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis.  Judicial precedent means that judges will 
seek a precedent or a leading case for their argumentation or reasoning.  The doctrine of stare 
decisis on the other hand, means that the ratio decidendi or the principle(s) of law must be 
documented and this becomes case law. So judges first give their decisions verbally in court 
and later these judgments are written down.  Significant judgments from the high courts and all 
judgments from the appellate courts are then published in law reports (Gibbons, 1994; Tiersma, 
1999).  This focus on the written word was finalized in the United States of America in the 
eighteenth century when “judges systematically issued written opinions” (Tiersma, 1999, p.37). 
In the United Kingdom and the United States of America, the books containing such reports 
are known as reports; but in Malaysia the two leading reports are the Malayan Law Journal and 
the Current Law Journal.  
What is a judicial opinion? In common law adversarial tradition, judges are trained as 
advocates and they must listen to the evidence adduced in court from which they then construct 
and balance to arrive at the truth. This expression of what the law is to a judge, is a judicial 
opinion and “addresses two matters: result and reason” (Belleau &Johnson, 2008, p.58). A 
judicial opinion, or otherwise known as a case report, is a genre (Bhatia, 1983) and usually 
adopts   a formal tone.  To this end, Tiersma (1999, p.139) adds,
while it is “supposedly ‘objective’  rather than ‘persuasive’,  a judge usually aims to 
persuade the reader that his decision was correct, but the objective tone suggests that 
the outcome is the only rational conclusion in light of the law and the facts. 
Nevertheless, Tiersma (1999) has also found that judges do vary their tone and form and 
this includes the use of humor, poetry and metaphor. While humor is generally unacceptable 
(Prosser, 1952 in Tiersma, 1999) poetry and metaphor have their followers. Notwithstanding 
how an opinion is written, it must however, appear to be impartial, and Gibbon (1994) opines 
that judgments are supposed to have an individual tenor. On this point, and when dissenting, 
Tiersma (1999, p.140) states, “Judges give themselves more stylistic latitude in dissenting 
opinions.” He then proceeded with two examples. In the first, the dissenting judge in a Supreme 
Court case that declared the act of burning the American flag was protected free speech, sang 
the first verse of the national anthem in his dissent. In the second, when it was held by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court that Henry Miller’s Tropic of Cancer  was not legally obscene, 
the dissenting judge famous for being an acerbic dissenter (Tiersma 1999, p.140), employed 
the image of filth with the metaphor of an open sewer and a collocation of words that depict 
foul and filth to criticize the majority decision. 
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  Interestingly, judicial reasoning is evolved through syllogism and hence a number 
of judges may come to the same conclusion, albeit different routes; or entirely different 
conclusions.  As such, in appeal cases, if there are three or five judges, there can be as many 
judgments or opinions.  So, when a case is heard in an appellate court with a coram of 3, 5, 7, 
the decision can be unanimous or non-unanimous, i.e. majority. 
  Judicial disagreements however, are of two types: concurring or dissenting. To concur 
means to agree, but a concurring opinion is a form of judicial disagreement where a judge, 
who writes concurring reasons arrives at the same decision as the majority, but provides a 
different rationale or reason.  On the other hand, dissent is the written expression of judicial 
disagreement, in an appellate court that is not unanimous in its judgment.  According to Fahri 
Azzat (2010, p.1), a dissent has five functions, and they are to help the reader  
i.   understand the meaning and implications of the majority opinion;
ii.   predict how justice will come out in future cases;
iii.   see the limits of majority holding;
iv.   see where the ‘fight’ was
v.   react
 
While dissent is a disagreement, it is not quarrelsome disagreement, as alludes 
Laffranquela (2003, p.173).  In common law countries, the dissenting opinion will quickly 
become a completely normal part of the decision-making process.  It is accepted that all judges 
cannot be of the same opinion in collegial decision-making, therefore the openness of the 
administration of justice includes the publication of the dissenting opinion.
Within a similar common law jurisdiction, the importance of dissent is alluded by 
Khanna J, of the   Supreme Court of India.  A leading habeas corpus case (Additional District 
Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla AIR [1976] SC 1207) states:
As observed by Chief Justice Hughes, judges are not there simply to decide cases, but 
to decide them as they think they should be decided, and while it may be regrettable 
that they cannot always agree, it is better that their independence should be maintained 
and recognized than that unanimity should be secured through its sacrifice. A dissent 
in a Court of last resort, to use his words, is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, 
to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error 
into which the dissenting Judge believes the Court to have been betrayed.
Dissenting can thus be seen as a ‘necessary evil’ in the carriage of the due process of 
law. Hence, despite  Solan’s (1998)  belief that “judges usually care deeply about making the 
best decision they can, and about conveying their decision in a manner that makes the decision 
appear  as fair as possible to the parties, and often to the public”  (p. 1),  the question is,  is this 
always true?
LITERATURE REVIEW
In the Introduction of The Handbook of Forensic Linguistics, Coulthard and Johnson (2010) 
fittingly put an opening quote from Halliday that states,   “Language is as it is because of what it 
has to do” (1973, p.34).  Nearly forty years down the road, the quote still rings true.  The use of 
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language in the courtroom has been increasingly studied and developing from a sociolinguistic 
inquiry, it has increased in width and depth embracing the disciplines of linguistics, law, 
criminology and sociology.   The birth of forensic linguistics with a professional association 
formed in 1993, has also given further impetus to the work.  
The work on judicial dissent is an interesting mix of spoken and written discourse on 
the one hand, and the law and language, on the other.  Spoken legal discourse has been well 
researched notably in counsel-witness interactions from Atkinson and Drew’s (1979) seminal 
work  to  O’Barr’s (1982), Maley (1991), Gibbons (1994) and Tiersma  (1999) to the more 
recent Cotterill’s (2007) close analysis of the O.J. Simpson trial, and Noraini Ibrahim (2007) 
among others.   On written legal discourse, the focus  has been on interpretations of rules and 
legislations, genre of judgments (Bhatia, 1987;  Maley, 1985),  Trosborg (1995) on contracts, 
as well as Solan’s (1993) Language of Judges, which enquires into “how and why judges write 
about the structure and meaning of language to justify their decision”.  Solan (1993) however, 
he did not indulge in the language of dissent. 
                       
IS A NON-IDEOLOGICAL JUDGE A MYTH?
Philips (1998) states that judicial behaviour has always been an area of interest to social scientists 
notably in variations in sentencing practices.  Her ethnographic research, which began “as an 
anthropological study of judicial behaviour in an American trial court…. became an analysis of 
the way ideological diversity is organized in legal discourses” (1998,p. xi). Within the hierarchy 
of the US legal system, Philips found that the trial judges she observed 
acknowledged that they had become judges through a process influenced by party 
politics and political ideologies,   and they acknowledged having political ideologies 
themselves.  But they did not feel that the political ideologies should influence what 
they did in the courtroom.  (p. xiii)
Philips (1998) went further to say that the position of these trial judges were consistent 
with the fact that they were trial judges and they only implement the law and not make law as 
the “law is made by the state legislature and the appellate court”(p. xiii).  Drawing a parallel 
from this, Philips adds, “…. it is reasonable to expect appellate court judges to be ‘ideological’ 
in the political  sense of conservative versus liberal, and to expect this to influence the law 
they make…” (p. xiii).  What is also enlightening is her finding on the ideological differences 
between the record-oriented judge versus the procedure oriented judge, which were found to 
be the result of their selection and elevation to the bench:  by election or appointment.  At this 
juncture, it might be relevant to ponder if such ideological bearings are overtly present in the 
Malaysian courtroom and manifested in the judgments meted out.              
As language behaviour signals ideology, Finegan (2010, quoting from Savage 14 
May 2009) recounted an instance of opposition to an appointment of Judge Sonia Sotomayer 
as proposed member of the United States Supreme Court.   Despite her qualifications, her 
nomination was ‘marred’ by a statement she had given eight years prior to the event, when she 
had said,   
I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experience would more 
often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that life.
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The good judge has revealed possible gender and ethnic biasness which may have been 
problematic to the selection committee and it contrasted starkly with one credited to Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor, the first woman appointed to the US Supreme Court.  If  Sotomayer 
has alluded to her ethnicity and gender, O’Connor was quoted  as saying, “. in deciding cases, 
a wise old man and a wise old woman would reach the same conclusion (Finegan, 2010, p.67), 
thus propagating the essence of justice,  namely impartiality and the appearance of it (Chan, 
2007).
It is thus interesting to see what ideological manifestations will be uncovered and what 
may be the impetus for such ideological leanings.
DISSENT
While there is a dearth in the study of the language of dissent, the impact of dissenting has 
not been neglected.  Primus (1998), for instance, claims that dissents have the potential to be 
canonical, and this means that appellate courts must, where necessary be active in dissenting, 
or at least in concurring.  Laffranque (2003) on the other hand, has found that dissenting is 
crucial for judicial independence but warns that the misuse of it may lead to high risk.  It is 
interesting to note that much of the concern stated in other jurisdictions are parallel to that of 
local works as in  Chan (2007) and  Fahri Azzat (2010).
In relation to ideological stance and specifically, gender and judgment, Belleau and 
Johnson (2008) found that Canadian female judges dissent more than agree, to the extent that 
some of them have been called the ‘Great Dissenters’. However, the authors claimed that while 
“The statistics are provocative, [they] do not provide straight forward answers about gender 
and judging (p. 57).  The absence of such correlation is apparently because there is little to 
show the “substance of disagreement” (p. 66).  Hence, for each dissent, a very close text or 
qualitative analysis must be carried out.
On the linguistic markers of dissent, Belleau and Johnson (2004, p. 178), describe such 
markers as those that “draw deeply on the persuasive resources of language” (p. 178).  In 
conjunction with this,   Brennan (1999), states that judges use language to  ‘appeal to the 
future,’ ‘capture the brooding spirit’, or ‘sow seeds for future harvest’  besides  articulating  “ 
alternative  vision of ‘the real’, re-describe the facts, re-draw the boundary between the legal 
and the social, and challenge how we think about law itself “  (Belleau & Johnson, 2004, 
p.178).  
In order to identify the markers, a good starting point is Trosborg (1997), as seen in 
Figure 1 below
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FIGURE 1: TROSBORG’S (1997) TEXT TYPOLOGY
The typology shows a classification of five types of texts: narrative, instructive, 
argumentative, expository and descriptive.  Of the five,  Mochales (2008) claims that 
argumentation mainly occurs in dissenting opinions and here the dominant language features 
observed are as follows: modality, thinking verbs, general and abstract nouns, adverbs of 
manner, simple present tense and conjunctions.
   While Belleau and Johnson (2004) cite the use of rhetorical structures like 
‘evidence  was presented’ or ‘nothing before the court indicates’ in cases heard in Canada, 
Finegan (2010), enquires into the “linguistic expression of judicial attitude” (p. 67)  from 
2008 opinions of the United States and California Supreme Courts.  The study shows that 
judges and notably, appellate judges do not “mute the intended expression” (p. 67).  Hence, 
Finegan (2010) document the use of adjectives (predicative and attributive), verb choices and 
adverbials as well as adverbs as expressions of attitude and emphasis. The study further reveals 
that adverbs and adverbials form the bulk of expressions of attitude and expressions. While 
adverbials add to the content, adverbs do not as the following examples from Finegan (2010, 
pp. 72-73) demonstrate:    
1. Not surprisingly, the parties vigorously dispute the waiver issue, and it sharply divided the 
Court. (It should not surprise us that…).  
2. But when discussing the words, the Court simply ignores the preamble. (But when discussing 
the words, the Court ignores the preamble). 
Finegan has also categorized several adverbials as having different functions like 
emphasis on manner for instance, the use of of course, naturally, obviously, clearly, which 
may be used to enhance weak propositions and as such, should be used judiciously.   Finegan’s 
study also alludes to Long and Christensen (2006)  whose findings show that in  non-unanimous 
decisions, intensifiers have been  widely used and the dissenting judges were “by far the worst 
offenders” (p. 76).
To conclude this review, it can be stated that while the impact of dissent cannot be 
denied and is gaining much recognition, the same cannot be said of studies that are to examine 
the very ‘tools’  that are used to realize the dissent.  As there are no local studies to allude to, 
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the literature afforded from the west makes it very interesting because the use of language 
is context-driven, thereby raising two issues.  First, are the same linguistic features that are 
documented in the west used in the Malaysian courtroom?  And second, are these feature 
employed to give the same attitudinal meaning given the premise that our worldviews ‘ought’ 
to be different? This is yet another gap in knowledge that may be bridged.       
METHODOLOGY
This paper employed a mixed-approach in its design.  The qualitative approach is an analysis 
of human thought and perception, and Strauss and Corbin (1990 as cited in Hoephl, 1997) 
claimed that this approach can be employed to better understand any phenomenon about which 
little is yet known.   For ease of identification of features, a corpus linguistic approach was used 
as it was speedier.   This method was employed by Cotterill (2007) in analyzing the trial of the 
famous ex-American footballer, O.J. Simpson, among others.   
DATA SELECTION 
The case reports selected were sourced from the Lexis Nexis database for the Malayan Law 
Journal with a focus on cases heard from 2000-2010.  The search yielded 35 cases with 
dissenting opinions, but for the purpose of this study that enquires into an ideological stance, 
three cases were selected. The first two cases involved the same parties, Lina Joy vs Majlis 
Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Ors., heard on appeal firstly at the Court of Appeal 
and finally at the Federal Court. It was an apostasy case with the key issue being an appeal to 
change the appellant’s name in her National Registration Identity Card (NRIC), and to drop 
Islam, as her religion. The third case is another civil case, Chong Swee Huat & Anor. V Lim 
Shian Ghee [2009]. 
The cases were chosen because of their intrinsic value:  Lina Joy was controversial 
in Malaysia due to the main issues; and Chong Swee Huat due to the dissenting judge, Datuk 
Zainon Ali, a female judge and one out of three in 2009, from a coram of twenty two.
The key issues as presented to the appeal courts are as follows.
  
Case Report  1: Lina Joy V Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Ors  
[2005] 6MLJ 193 (Court of Appeal, Putrajaya) 
Panel of Judges Type/Place of Court Dissenting Judge
1. Gopal Sri Ram, 
2. Abdul Aziz Mohamad 
3. Arifin Zakaria 
Court of Appeal 
(Putrajaya)                Gopal Sri Ram
The facts of the case in brevity are as follows.  The appellant, Azalina bte Jailani, who 
was born a Muslim, had baptized as a Christian and wanted to change her name first to Lina 
Lelani and later to Lina Joy.  This required for a name change in her NRIC.  She therefore 
applied to the National Registration department (NRD) to have that done and to remove the 
word ‘Islam’ from her NRIC.  When the case was first heard it was initially a constitutional 
issue but on closer perusal and with the agreement of the parties, the Court of Appeal decided to 
abandon the constitutional issue and focused on the administrative issue.  Hence, the issue that 
was heard was  whether the NRD was right in law in rejecting the appellant’s application under 
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Reg 14 of the National Registration Regulations 1990 to have the statement of her religion 
as ‘Islam’ deleted from her NRIC and in requiring a certificate and/or order from the Syariah 
Court.  
By majority, the Court of Appeal answered in the affirmative. 
Case Report  2: Lina Joy lwn Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan dan lain-lain 
[2007] 4MLJ  585 (Federal Court , Putrajaya)
Panel of Judges Type/Place of Court Dissenting Judges
1. Ahmad Fairuz Sheikh Abdul Halim
2. Richard Malanjun
3. Alauddin  Mohd Sheriff 
Federal Court 
(Putrajaya) Richard Malanjun
The appellant sought for leave to appeal to the Federal Court arising from the answer 
by the majority of the Court of appeal.  Para 49 of the case is as follows: 
  
Para 49:  When hearing of the appeal proper began learned counsel for the parties 
herein initially agreed to approach the matter purely from the administrative law aspect.   
However, upon being allowed to express their views during the hearing learned counsel 
for the various interested non-governmental bodies appearing on watching brief raised 
some constitutional issues which the Appellant and Respondent agreed to skip earlier 
on.  Hence in fairness to the appellant and respondents this court allowed their learned 
counsel to submit on those issues to reply. 
CASE REPORT 3: Chong Swee Huat & Anor.  V Lim Shian Ghee 
[2009] 3 MLJ 665   (Court of Appeal, Putrajaya)
Panel of Judges Type/Place of Court Dissenting Judge
1. James Foong
2. Zainun Ali
3. Vincent Ng
Court of Appeal 
(Putrajaya) Zainun Ali
This is a civil case on tort for damages arising out of libel. This issue was whether special 
damages was proved and whether award of aggravated damages was proper when defendants 
had expressly apologized within period requested by plaintiff.  The dissenting judge, Zainun 
Ali was of the opinion that in the face of the withdrawal of   the impugned words and apology 
by the defendant, the demand for further apologies and the sum of RM980, 000 by the plaintiff 
were unjustified and could ironically be said to be actuated by malice. What was crucial was 
at the time of his comments, the defendant honestly believed it to be true. The plaintiff in this 
connection failed to establish that the defendant was actuated by malice when he made the 
said comment. In the circumstances, the learned trial judge had erred in awarding the plaintiff 
the sum of RM980, 000 as special damages, when the plaintiff had led no evidence on special 
damages. Once the cases were downloaded, each case was read in its entirety and then the 
dissenting judgments were located and perused carefully.     
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DATA ANALYSIS 
As the researchers read through the entire opinion, linguistic markers of stance and attitude were 
identified and highlighted.  Here, adverbs and adverbials as well as markers of deference (With 
the greatest respect, I beg to differ, etc) were identified.  However, the researchers have also 
found a high use of modal verbs.  Hence, a corpus-based software Wordsmith tools was used 
to draw out the adverbs and the modals. In the case of the former.  Figure 2 below illustrates 
the concordance of Accordingly.  
  
FIGURE 2: Concordance of ‘Accordingly’
As close reading revealed the use of modality, the next step was to elicit the modals 
used. However, as there were many occurrences for would, the researchers decided to focus 
only on those preceded by the first person, as in I would.  This is because in a dissent, the judge 
would want to make his opinion very clear. 
3L: The Southeast Asian Journal of English Language Studies – Vol 17(Special Issue): 45 - 60
54   \
FIGURE 3: Concordance of ‘would’
DISCUSSION
The data collected for the three dissents are quite extensive but the style of presentation is 
different from that of the 80s and 90s.  One of the differences is in the numbered paragraphs 
as opposed previously where the paragraphs were identified according to alphabets.   As these 
reports are now available on line perhaps the typeface and single column is influenced by the 
current medium.
As the judges’ opinions are now presented in numbered paragraphs, Gopal Sri Ram’s 
dissent is in Para 21 to Para 70.  In the Federal Court, Richard Malunjun’s dissent is rather 
lengthy, from Para 21 to 109.  In Zainun Ali’s case, her dissent is from Para 46 to 238. In short, 
all the dissents are longer than the majority opinions.
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Interestingly, however, only Zainun Ali’s dissent was awarded a reply from Vincent Ng 
JCA.  On closer examination, this is not a regular act for any jurisdiction, thus adding the merit 
for the selection of her opinion. It will also be interesting to see if she belongs to the female 
“Great Dissenters” as mentioned earlier.
In relation to the use of linguistic markers to demonstrate dissent, the following findings 
are revealed.  Firstly, the data show an abundance of modality, adverbs, markers of deference 
as well as nominalizations to impute of lesser cognition and/ or ability.  
MODALITY IN USE
The modals that are used generously here are would, should, could and must. Quirk, Leech 
and Startvik  (1980) state that would has at least five different functions:  willingness (weak 
volition), insistence, characteristic activity, hypothetical meaning in main clause and probability, 
but in the dissent where the judge said  I would  there is no denying that the function is that of 
insistence.  Such an example is seen below;
             
Case 2, Para 83  
With respect I would say that the majority judgment erred in considering an issue….. 
In  relation to the use of should,   Quirk, Leech and Startvik  (1980) state that there are at least four 
functions, namely obligation and logical necessity, putative use after certain expressions,  hypothetical use (first 
person and especially British English) in the main clause with a conditional sub-clause, and tentative conditioning 
conditional clauses.   The data reveal that the modal should functions mostly as obligation and logical necessity 
as shown below:   
Case 1, Para71  
So far as the Majlis Agama Islam, Wilayah Persekutuan (the Islamic Religious Council 
of the Federal Territory) is concerned, in my view it was wrongly joined as a party and 
should be struck out as should the Government of Malaysia. 
Case 2, Para 22
Hence, it is thus my task to express my views and reasons on what I think should be 
the outcome of the appeal.            
In both cases above, Gopal Sri Ram JCA and Richard Malujun FCA have used should 
to show that it is of utmost importance that their opinion be accepted due to their reading of the 
interpretation of the law.
 On the employment of could,   Quirk, Leech and Startvik (1980) state that it is employed 
to demonstrate three functions: ability, permission and probability. Let us turn to the data 
samples.         
Case 2, Para 11
Thus the NRD could not call for documentary evidence that the appellant was or was 
not a Muslim.
                  
Case 2, Para 80
Such an approach could only be correct if the history of the present appeal is omitted.
                   
The analysis of could is rather interesting as the semantics of the modal has to be 
discerned from not only the propositions alone but must allude to the linguistic environment as 
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well. The nuances are rather close. In Para 11,  could  is used to show the lack of ability on the 
part of the NRD to call for  documentary evidence of apostasy  because the appellant had not 
submitted any evidence to show that she was not a Muslim.
  In the case of Para 80, could is used to show the possibility of and in his case it alludes 
to the adoption of the approach taken by the majority of the coram in following an earlier case. 
The dissenting judge was of the opinion that the facts of the case were different and so the 
approach must also be different.
On the use of must, Quirk, Leech and Startvik (1980) have shown that this modal has 
two functions; obligation and necessity.  Again as in the case of the other modals, must has been 
used quite frequently.  However, the determination of function has not been easy.  However, 
from the linguistic environment, obligation is when the modal is followed by a negation as in 
must + not, while necessity is when the modal is followed by the copula ‘be’ as in must + be.   
          ADVERBS AND ADVERBIALS
As mentioned in the literature, dissent is very much represented by adverbs and adverbials.  The 
data revealed the 33 adverbs employed of which among them are:  admirably, automatically, 
accordingly, broadly, correctly, deliberately, unfortunately, wrongly, etc.  Such a finding thus 
alludes to Trosborg’s dominant markers in argumentation.  Some of the examples from the data 
are as follows:
[74]   …….I would therefore think that in coming to its decision to reject the application 
of the appellant on account of non-production of an order or a certificate of apostasy 
from the Federal Territory Syariah Court or Islamic authorities NRD had asked itself 
the wrong question and had taken legally irrelevant factor into account and excluded 
legally relevant factor.
 
[75]   Accordingly I am inclined to agree with the submission of learned counsel for 
the appellant that ‘in requiring…’ 
[79]   With respect, the holding in the majority judgment of the Court of Appeal completely 
disregarded the fact that the appellant made several applications for a change of name
As mentioned in the literature review, Finegan (2010) stated that adverbials add to the 
content but adverbs do not, and hence accordingly in Para 75 is an adverb and completely in 
Para 79 is an adverbial. 
MARKERS OF DEFERENCE AND APPEAL TO ‘BRETHREN’ 
The data also reveal the use of expressions that show appeal to the brethren accompanied by 
deference.  While this act has been extensively covered in Belleau and Johnson (2004), as well 
as other writers, it is rather surprising that in all three cases, only Richard Malunjun used them 
extensively.  As examples, let us turn to the following:
Case 2, Para 19
I   had the privilege of deliberating with their Lordships the  learned Chief Justice and 
Mr. Justice Dato’ Alauddin, FCJ on  the draft judgment for this appeal.
Case 2, Para 20
With the greatest respect I am unable to concur with them on the final decision of this appeal. 
Hence, it is thus my task to express my views and reasons on what I think should be the outcome 
of this appeal.
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 Case 2, Para 71
With respect, I am unable to agree with the majority judgment   of the Court of Appeal and the 
submission of the learned Senior Federal counsel. I think the minority judgment of the Court of 
Appeal took the correct approach in the construction of those Regulations when it said this:…
It is rather interesting that despite his strong views, this FCA judge stood his ground 
and remained composed and civil in his dissent.  He did not resort to any negative insinuations 
though the researchers believe that sharing the same religious faith as the appellant and hearing 
this apostasy case, it must have been difficult to see the law interpreted the way it was.  Hence, 
much of FCA’s intertextual references were to the rule of law and the Federal Constitution. 
This is unequivocally described in Para 23 and 24, his preliminary findings as reproduced 
below:
[23]    Sworn to uphold the Federal Constitution (the Constitution), it is my task to 
ensure that it is upheld at all times by giving effects to what I think the founding 
Fathers of this great nation had in mind when they framed this sacred document. 
[24]    It is therefore my view that when considering an issue of constitutional 
importance it is vital to bear in mind that all other interests and feelings, personal 
or otherwise, should give way and assume only a secondary role if at all…  
Having stated his caveat, Richard Malunjun FCA then explained his positioning and 
intent as a judge within multiracial and multi religious Malaysia, aware of the bigger picture 
and the need for law to maintain  order in the country and hence we note the following: 
  25]    I would also say that the appeal before us is indeed not easy to resolve for it 
involves issues of critical importance in the hearts and minds of the people 
in this country. Cursory handling may result in unnecessary anxieties to the 
general public. Thus, intensive discussions and research works had to be done 
with great patience and sincerity before any conclusion could be made.
Hence, there are instances when ideological stance needs to be ‘masked’ because a 
judge needs to be impartial and be seen to be impartial (Chan 2007).  Likewise, the majority 
judges may have also been rather concerned with their argumentation as they had to deal 
with the same issues, albeit from a different point, amidst the growing sentiments that were 
brewing outside the courtroom at that time. In short, both sides, the majority and the dissenting, 
practice civility among themselves, which according to Lebovits (2006) and Chan (2007) are 
the markers of a judge, who knows his craft.   Hence, by demonstrating civility on the bench 
notably at the hierarchy of law-making, the judges show that they are conscious of their role in 
the legal world.
What is also interesting about this dissent is that apart from intertextual references 
that are beyond the scope of this paper, there are also inclusions of verbs choices that are 
rather strong. For instance in Para 76, he said, “The majority judgment of the Court of Appeal 
circumvented the above by holding thus…”
IMPUTATIONS OF INCOMPETENCE 
In the discussion on FCA Richard Malunjun’s dissent above, we note how the judge maintained 
decorum and civility in difficult situations.  However, maintaining civility is not always the 
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case.  In our third case, Zainun JCA demonstrates how judges do not always temper their 
emotive tone and do not employ subtlety in their judgment.
A close analysis shows her disagreement not with the majority directly, but with the 
trial judge and so imputations of incompetence were executed with the use of sarcasm and 
derogatory nouns as reproduced from her preliminary findings.  The sarcasm in Para 82 and the 
use of derogatory terms as hogwash in para 83 attest to this.       
   
 [82]   In any case, after a thorough analysis of the evidence before him, the learned 
judge found that the defendant had failed on a balance of probabilities, to defend 
the plaintiff’s claim of defamation. The learned judge granted the plaintiff’s 
claim and ordered damages as are found in his order.
[83]   So there you have it. In my view the entire claim of the plaintiff is merely 
hogwash and is thus untenable. And it must fail. My reasons are as follows. 
Further analysis reveals that that this female judge had allowed herself to employ a 
rather hostile and contentious  tone  as well as legally serious imputations like ‘misdirections 
in law’  (Para 181),  ‘glossed over the fact’ , etc.   What is interesting ideologically is when a 
comparison is made between Cases 1and 2 with case 3, there is marked difference in judicial 
and linguistic behavior.  But this cannot be alluded to gender because of the small sample nor 
can it be alluded to issues.  It would be interesting however, to engage in a bigger corpus of 
data from the dissent of Zainun Ali JCA to see if this is her craft and if this is her ideology of 
a dissent.
For her dissent, Zainun Ali JCA was awarded a reply by Vincent Ng JCA who tempered 
it with the following:
Vincent Ng JCA: (a reply):
[239] After having read the grounds of judgment of my learned brother, James 
Foong Cheng Yuen JCA and the views in brief of my learned sister Zainun 
Ali JCA, I wish to now state my considered views in the following manner. 
               
 In short, the majority had indeed alluded to an appeal of brethren and measured tone to 
reply to the hostile dissent. In this manner, the public’s confidence in the judiciary is maintained 
as the case will be read and re-read by litigants and the public.  
CONCLUSION
The heart of a judge’s reputation and function rests with the use of the pen.  While judges are 
to remain impartial so that justice can be served, judges may not be emotion free, and this may 
manifest in their opinion.  We note however, that in cases of national interest (as per Lina Joy), 
judges take extreme pains not to cause anxiety in their selection of words in dissenting (as per 
Richard Malunjun) but ideologically did he on the one hand, and the majority on the other, act 
in the name of the law or in the name of the religion that they profess? 
It is interesting thus to witness the use of modals to display strong volition, and of an 
uncommon practice, the use of derogatory nouns to show displeasure not at all tempered with 
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subtlety.  It is interesting to see if the more recent cases show a tendency to minimize deference 
especially at the Court of Appeal. So the question is,   are Malaysian judges moving away from 
the trend of the English judges in prose, style and temperament?  As this study is limited in 
corpus, the findings are inconclusive but they pave the way forward. 
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